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T he “extraordinary elevation” of Xi Jinping -Donald Trump’s description of the result of 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC)- echoes the extraordinary rise of China as a geoeconomic super-
power after Deng Xiaoping inaugurated the “reform and opening up” policy in 
1978. Geoeconomic power tends to become geopolitical power. This is Xi Jinping’s 
mid- to long-term objective. He has divided the history of the socialist revolu-
tion in China into three 30-year periods: the first dominated by “Mao Zedong 
Thought”, the second dominated by “Deng Xiaoping Theory”, and the new pe-
riod to be dominated by “Xi Jinping Thought” on “socialism with Chinese char-
acteristics for the New Era”. The “West” characterises China as an “emerging” 
economy. In historical terms China is re-emerging. It is returning to the pre-em-
inent position it held in the world economy before being subjected to Western 
imperial aggression in the 19th century. This is the essence of Xi’s “China Dream”. 
He defines it as the “rejuvenation” of China. In traditional Chinese terms, this 
means the consolidation of wealth and military power, two of the major themes 
of his political report to the National Congress. The first priority is to consolidate 
and maintain the CPC’s control of the political system. The second is to improve 
the people’s standard of living. The third is to “take centre stage” in world affairs. 
Taking centre stage involves the “China Model” of economic development and 
the modernisation and the strengthening of Chinese military power. Xi’s political 
report clearly states his confidence in China’s ability to become the “alternative” 
to the Western neoliberal model in the emerging world order that China will lead 
in the 21st century, a Pax Sinica. 
The fact that China and the China Model could become the alternative for the 
new era is a symptom of the obsolescence of the existing model -the post-World 
War II model based on Bretton Woods-type supranational institutions dominat-
ed by America and Europe. The Western neoliberal model was defined by the 
“Washington Consensus”. What Xi calls the China Model has been referred to 
as the “Beijing Consensus”. China’s emergence as an economic superpower has 
coincided with the rapidly accelerating decline of two of the imperial powers that 
dominated world affairs since the 18th century. The pro-Brexit vote in the UK re-
flects a deep-rooted, outdated and futile nostalgia for the lost British Empire and 
the Pax Britannica. Trump’s call to “Make America Great Again” is at the same 
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time an admission that the US is no longer great. The election of Trump reflects a 
deep-rooted, outdated and futile nostalgia for the lost American Empire and the 
Pax Americana. Both cases represent a 180º turn in geopolitical strategy, away 
from free trade and international cooperation toward protectionism and isolation-
ism. In his criticism of the policies of Trump, John McCain has eloquently sum-
marised the role that the US played in world affairs on the basis of a set of ideals 
that the Trump Administration has abandoned, thereby contradicting a US for-
eign policy tradition that stretches back over three-quarters of a century. McCain 
insists that the US has done good in the world while exercising world leadership, 
that the US has a moral obligation to continue to do so, that not continuing to do 
so would bring shame on the US, and that the US would not deserve to thrive in 
a world where US ideals and leadership were absent.
Donald Trump’s “America First” policy has eliminated the moral authority of the 
US in world affairs. He has provoked Angela Merkel into warning EU leaders 
that they can no longer rely on the US. The rejection of free trade and the rejection 
of any attempt to combat climate change have isolated the US in the new world 
order, as has Brexit in the case of the UK (and the EU has come to realise that the 
loss of the UK may not be such a bad thing). America’s obsession with controlling 
the Middle East made the US abandon other regions of the world. This facilitated 
China’s rise as a regional power in Asia. Chinese investments overseas have al-
lowed China to become a major source of foreign aid to Africa and Latin America, 
displacing the US and the EU. The strongest defender of free trade on a global 
scale at Davos is Xi Jinping. The US attempt to stop its NATO allies from joining 
the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) that was promoted by China 
was a dismal failure. The AIIB has become an alternative to the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and has thereby diluted the control that 
Europe and the US can exercise over developing nations. China promotes South-
South cooperation in international organisations, at the expense of North-South 
asymmetrical relations. China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” to build transport in-
frastructures across the Eurasian continent and the Indian Ocean will transform 
the economies of the participating countries, especially in Central Asia. It will also 
shift the balance of power in Afro-Eurasia, displacing the role of the 7th Fleet of the 
US Navy as the arbiter of hard power in the region.
Today, as in the past, China has opted for trade and commerce as the means to 
maintain a peaceful and stable world order, rather than expansionism and mili-
tary dominance. China offers a win-win situation in the new era that Xi has pro-
claimed. It offers the creation of an economic interdependence based on equali-
ty, mutual respect and mutual profit. China wins in this situation, but so do its 
partners. The US intelligence community has recognised the decline of America’s 
ability to impose its will on the world or to maintain its dominance over both the 
Eastern and the Western hemisphere and is calling for new strategies to protect 
US interests in a world no longer dominated by the US. Donald Trump and his 
supporters are not listening. They are worried about short-term electoral results, 
a problem that does not impede Xi Jinping’s leadership of China’s long march to 
centre stage.
